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Abstract:
Philosophers and legal theorists still disagree about the correct analysis of ‘rights’, both
moral and legal. The ‘Will Theory’ and the ‘Interest Theory’—the two main views—can
each account for various features of rights, but neither of them is totally satisfactory.
The controversy has now been running for decades and seems irresolvable. I will con-
tend in this paper that the discussion of ‘value pluralism’ in the Berlinian tradition can
illuminate the debate over the concept of rights.
Philosophers and legal theorists still disagree about the correct analysis of
‘rights’, both moral and legal. The ‘Will Theory’ and the ‘Interest Theory’—the
two main views—can each account for various features of rights, but neither of
them is totally satisfactory. The controversy has now been running for decades
and seems irresolvable.1 I will contend in this paper that the discussion of ‘value
pluralism’ in the Berlinian tradition can illuminate the debate over the concept
of rights.
Value pluralism says that there is a plurality of conﬂicting and incommensu-
rable universal values (Crowder 2002, 45). Values are said to be incommensu-
rable “when they raise radically distinct considerations such that there seems,
prima facie, to be no reason to rank one ahead of another in all or most cases”
(Crowder 2002, 53). This is the conception of incommensurability Isaiah Berlin
embraced. Because it does not include a time variable, I call it ‘synchronic value
pluralism’. It centrally claims that there is no general procedure to rank ab-
stract values in such a way so as to allow the resolution of practical conﬂicts in
particular cases. There is a second conception of value pluralism that I call ‘di-
achronic value pluralism’. This conception maintains the theses of rivalry and
* I am grateful to Larry Alexander, Dick Arneson, Daniel Weinstock and, especially my commen-
tator, Professor Christopher Wonnell, for their helpful comments during the ‘Isaiah Berlin, Value
Pluralism, and the Law’ conference held at the University of San Diego School of Law on Febru-
ary 20–21, 2009. I have also beneﬁted from comments made by Marcelo Ferrante, Jeff McMahan,
Guido Pincione, Dave Schmidtz, and Fernando Teson. A prior version of this article is published
in the San Diego Law Review 46(4), 2009.
1 For a state of the question, see Kramer, Simmonds & Steiner 1998.356 Horacio Spector
incommensurability of values but incorporates time as a relevant variable. It
claims that at any given time t in the course of human history, there is a plural-
ity of conﬂicting and incommensurable universal values whose existence started
at some time t¡1 (earlier than t), and that it is possible for the plurality of val-
ues existing at t to be a proper subset of a plurality of values that will exist at
some time tÅ1 (later than t). This conception is committed to the view that new
values emerge over time according to various cultural, political, and economic
transformations. This does not mean that values are subjective or relative to
a given culture. Rather, values emerge at a certain time, but their existence is
objective and universal.
The diachronic conception of value pluralism draws on Joseph Raz’s theory of
values. Raz stresses the dependence of values on sustaining social practices (Raz
2003, 21f.). In fact, Raz argues that although the existence of values has social
preconditions, as long as the preconditions are met and the corresponding values
come into being, their existence persists without restrictions. Raz explains the
asymmetry of emergence and continued existence in this way:
“The usual pattern is for the emergence, out of previous social forms,
of a new set of practices, bringing into life a new form: monogamous
marriage between partners chosen by each other, the opera, and so
on, with their attendant excellences. Once they come into being,
they remain in existence even if the sustaining practices die out.”
(Raz 2003, 21f.)
Now, Raz does not say that his ‘social dependence’ thesis implies value plural-
ism. Rather, he says that the thesis that values depend on social practices can
accommodate value pluralism, because it implies that value judgments depend
on genres or kinds that evolve culturally, e.g., opera, sports, and democratic pol-
itics, and different genre-bound evaluations need not be logically contradictory
(Raz 2003, 44f.). Therefore, Raz’s social dependence thesis is not the same as di-
achronic value pluralism, but there is a resemblance between the two positions.
Political and legal culture has been diversiﬁed by the cumulative accretion
of values that express human beings’ concerns in reaction to different histor-
ical predicaments. New value paradigms coexist with older value paradigms,
because the latter are central to forms of life that continue to deﬁne people’s
sense of identity and meaningfulness. By the same token, values are incom-
mensurable with one another because each value presupposes a distinct form of
life that cannot be ranked along an order of forms of life.2 That is, values are
incommensurable with each other due to the incommensurability of their sup-
porting forms of life. An outsider can interpret the value paradigm of an alien
society even if he does not share the relevant form of life, provided he adopts
a participant’s point of view. In adopting the internal perspective, the outsider
translates the beliefs and concerns of the foreign society into his own forms of
2 See Williams 1985. Bernard Williams also says that different cultures or forms of life may be
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life and value paradigms. Other things being equal, the greater the distance be-
tween the outsider’s paradigms and those of the society he wants to understand,
the higher the risk that the translation will only be an approximate one (Hart
1961, 55).
I will argue that the diachronic conception of value pluralism explains why
conceptual fragmentation in normative language is a natural and pervasive phe-
nomenon. Indeed, the meaning of normative terms embedded in successive in-
commensurable value paradigms often varies so radically that the concepts de-
noted by those terms disintegrate into different concepts. Speciﬁcally, I will
claim that a radical change of value paradigm has fragmented the concept of
rights, and that value incommensurability stands in the way of the concept’s
coalescing back. The thesis of conceptual fragmentation of normative language
explains in turn why the perennial debate on the analysis of rights has not yet
been brought to a close. In fact, rival and incommensurable value paradigms
lie behind the Will Theory and the Interest Theory.3 Since legal systems re-
ﬂect a diachronic plurality of rival and incommensurable values, the term right
is subject to radical semantic variation. Therefore, any analysis of the concept
of rights that goes beyond their mere correlativity to duties or their relation to
state enforcement will likely fail to explain existing linguistic practices.
The idea to be explored in this paper is kindred with two preceding views, one
in the philosophy of science and the other in moral philosophy. The ﬁrst is Paul
Feyerabend’s thesis on the radical variance of the meaning of terms embedded in
successive scientiﬁc theories.4 Feyerabend claims that the primitive terms of a
theory T’ often cannot be deﬁned by reference to the primitive descriptive terms
of a different theory T, nor correlated to them via correct empirical generaliza-
tions (Feyerabend 1962, 74–91). For instance, ‘impetus’ in Aristotle’s theory of
motion cannot be deﬁned within the vocabulary of Newton’s mechanics. In fact,
within Aristotelian mechanics “[t]he impetus of a body in empty space which is
not under the inﬂuence of any outer force remains constant” (Feyerabend 1962,
54). Under Newton’s mechanics, this proposition is empirically adequate but
there is no entity that acts as the cause of motion. Momentum, the most obvious
candidate, is rather the result of motion. Even if we formed the concept of such
a force, Newton’s second law would imply a zero value for such a force in the
case of inertial motion.5
The second view is Alasdair MacIntyre’s thesis on conceptual fragmentation
in normative discourses. MacIntyre argues that the Enlightenment project of
3 I develop here an idea originally proposed in. Chris Wellman (2005) and Siegfried Van Duffel
(2008) also claim that the dispute over the concept of rights relies on competing values and rival
paradigms. However, Wellman’s and Van Duffel’s arguments are very different from the one
developed here. For instance, neither Wellman nor Van Duffel discusses the relationship between
value pluralism and the two concepts of rights.
4 See Feyerabend 1962. This thesis overlaps with Kuhn’s famous thesis on the incommensurabil-
ity of scientiﬁc theories, though Kuhnean incommensurability far exceeds the strictly semantic
conception that I focus on in the text; see, e.g. Kuhn 2000.
5 Feyerabend 1962, 52–57. Newton’s second law of motion says that “[t]he acceleration of a body of
mass m is related to the force acting on it by F Æ ma”. See Woodhouse 2003, 3.358 Horacio Spector
trying to ﬁnd a rational basis for moral beliefs is foredoomed to failure, because
it relies on an ineradicably discrepant set of moral beliefs and a different vi-
sion of human nature (MacIntyre 1984, 51–61). MacIntyre says that the mod-
ern philosophers “inherited incoherent fragments of a once coherent scheme of
thought and action and, since they did not recognize their own peculiar historical
and cultural situation, they could not recognize the impossible and quixotic char-
acter of their self-appointed task” (MacIntyre 1984, 55). For instance, he shows
that the meaning of ought was ﬁxed in the classical Aristotelian framework in a
way that Enlightenment radically changed. Within the former framework says
MacIntyre,
“To say what someone ought to do is at one and the same time to say
what course of action will in these circumstances as a matter of fact
lead toward a man’s true end and to say what the law, ordained by
God and comprehended by reason, enjoins. Moral sentences are thus
used within this framework to make claims which are true or false.”
(1984, 53)
My plan is as follows. In section 1, I will indicate how the Will Theory and
the Interest Theory each capture distinct features of the usage of right in con-
temporary moral and legal discourse. However, I will also argue that neither
of the two theories is successful in explaining all the properties of rights. In
section 2, I will argue that the debate between the two theories is irresolvable,
because the Will Theory and the Interest Theory reﬂect the meaning of rights
within rival and incommensurable value paradigms existing in today’s moral
and legal culture. The incommensurability of the underlying value paradigms
leads to radical variance in the meaning of the term rights, despite the obvious
homonymy. Speciﬁcally, I will argue that the Will Theory represents a fragment
of an once-integrated normative framework, and that it is in abstraction from
such framework that this theory becomes beset by puzzles. In turn, the Inter-
est Theory is incompatible with the properties attributed to rights in the older
value paradigm. All in all, radical meaning variance makes a neutral external
analysis of rights impossible. Therefore, there is no reason to try to choose be-
tween two theories that mistakenly assume meaning invariance of normative
terms across rival and incommensurable value paradigms.
Finally, in section 3, I will claim that the term right nonetheless has an
invariant conceptual core across the two main value paradigms in which it is
embedded. Basically, rights entail state enforceability. This minimal seman-
tic overlap among various usages of rights explains the confusing coexistence of
various value paradigms and their associated normative terms.Value Pluralism and the Two Concepts of Rights 359
1. The Will Theory and the Interest Theory of Rights
The Will Theory was introduced in Anglo-American legal theory by H. L. A. Hart
under the name of ‘Choice Theory’, but it was classically defended by a number
of German jurists in the nineteenth century, and its roots go back to Kant (Sim-
monds 1998, 179). Hart endorses the Will Theory because it can explain why
rights reﬂect a distinctive concern for the individual. Under this view, a right
expresses the idea of “one individual being given by the law exclusive control,
more or less extensive, over another person’s duty so that in the area of conduct
covered by that duty the individual who has the right is a small-scale sovereign
to whom the duty is owed” (Hart 1982, 183). Hart goes on to say that a right
holder has at his disposal the “fullest measure of control” when he possesses: the
power to waive or extinguish the duty, the power to enforce it by legal actions
after actual or threatened breach of the duty, and the power to waive or extin-
guish the obligation to pay compensation for violation of the duty (Hart 1982,
183f.). So, for the Will Theory, Hohfeldian powers are central to rights.6
In its early formulation as the ‘Beneﬁt Theory’, the Interest theory was ﬁrst
suggested by Bentham (1970, 57). Under this view, A’s having a right to X
against B means that A is the beneﬁciary of B’s duty to do X. The German legal
scholar Rudolf von Jhering proposed a clearly recognizable form of the Interest
Theory when he changed his jurisprudential position from legal formalism to
legal instrumentalism.7 Von Jhering famously deﬁned a legal right as a “legally
protected interest” (von Jhering 1906, 339; author’s translation). In its most
plausible version, proposed by Joseph Raz (1986), the Interest Theory holds that
A’s having a right to X against B means that an interest of A’s, or an aspect of
his well being, is a sufﬁcient reason for holding B under a duty.8
Both the Will Theory and the Interest Theory provide partial explanations
of some essential features of rights in contemporary normative discourse, but
none of them can explain the whole set of essential features. Such features are:
some rights are alienable but others are necessarily inalienable; paternalistic
interferences with the right holder—within the range of his rights—are imper-
missible; all rights, regardless of their grounding value, outweigh or trump other
normative considerations grounded in subjective interests; and some rights are
more important than others.
If rights are understood as normative positions that satisfy all these features,
there are no rights according to the Will Theory and the Interest Theory. A non-
instantiated concept of rights is not helpful, because one essential condition of
any analysis of rights is that there are some rights, e.g., the right to liberty or
privacy. Although both theories fail, the reason for each theory’s failure is differ-
6 For Hohfeld, a normative power is a situation in which a person A can claim or waive another
person B’s duty. More generally, a normative power is a situation in which a person can modify
the normative position of another by his will.
7 See Habermas 1996a.
8 See Raz 1986, 165f.. The Interest Theory has also been defended by Neil MacCormick (1982), and
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ent. The Will Theory fails because it gives us only a fragment of a once uniﬁed
and coherent value framework. The Interest Theory fails because it subordi-
nates rights to the contingencies of varying subjective interests. This malleable
notion does not ﬁt at all within a previous value paradigm that still governs our
linguistic practices.
Let us discuss these failures in turn.9 First, the Will Theory cannot account
for inalienable rights, that is, for rights that the right holder cannot waive or re-
linquish. The problem is that inalienable rights are considered fundamental in
modern liberal culture. It seems paradoxical that the most fundamental rights,
like the right to life or liberty, are precisely those rights where the crucial ele-
ment identiﬁed by the Will Theory, namely, the control over the correlative duty,
is substantially absent (MacCormick 1977, 196). According to the Will Theory
inalienable rights cannot be full-ﬂedged rights.
A related problem is that the Will Theory is incapable of accounting for rights
in criminal law contexts. Hart (1982, 184) says that in the criminal law rights
have the lesser measure of control. But this is not a serious problem. In effect,
right holders do have a considerable measure of control under the criminal law
too, because they can usually waive the private law obligations whose breach is
prerequisite to considering certain conduct as a criminal offense. For instance,
if Amy waives her ownership right over her piano and no one else claims it,
Matt taking control of the piano cannot count as theft. Clearly, the right holder
lacks this type of control with respect to murder, for example. In many cases
of this kind, powers are wanting because the relevant right is an inalienable
one, so the preceding difﬁculty applies. What the right holder cannot typically
do under the criminal law is to cancel the offender’s criminal liability, because
prosecution is in most cases a public matter. This would create a problem for the
Will Theory if it were plausible to hold that victims have a right to determine the
punishment of perpetrators. The Interest Theory cannot explain inalienability
either. Indeed, if rights are grounded on subjective interests, why could a right
holder not relinquish his right if he were to pursue his interests more effectively
in this way? According to the Interest Theory, alienation or non-alienation are
matters to be assessed on the basis of the promotion of subjective interests, and,
therefore, on a case-by-case basis, rather than as a matter of principle.
Second, the Interest Theory cannot explain why moral rights generally block
interferences intended to advance more successfully the rights holder’s interests
(Mack 2000, 84). According to the non-consequentialist view of moral rights, if
A has a moral right to X, this right is valid whatever the consequences of its
fulﬁllment or infringement. This abstract idea entails that A’s moral right to
X—while not relinquished—holds even if A does not have a subjective interest
in X, and even if A does have an interest in non-X. The latter clause rules
out paternalistic interferences. Because the only basis for holding B under the
duty to respect A’s right is an interest of A’s, B could justiﬁably infringe A’s
9 There are other failures that I will not discuss in this paper. For instance, the Interest Theory
fails to explain why there are rights that are not in the right-holder’s interest, such as the right
to an inherited troublesome property. See Rainbolt 2006, 11, 14.Value Pluralism and the Two Concepts of Rights 361
right when doing so can advance more effectively A’s interests. For instance,
if the right to reject medical treatment was based on the patients’ interests, it
might be possible to justify the imposition of a blood transfusion on a Jehovah’s
Witness. This difﬁculty also bears on the Will Theory, because the fact that
right holders have powers over correlated duties is consistent with allowing the
government to cancel those powers when the government can better promote
in this way the interests of the right holder. Because the Will Theory fails to
display the grounds of the relevant powers, it cannot forbid paternalism on a
principled basis.
The third problem, noted by Joseph Raz with respect to the Interest Theory,
is that it fails to explain why the stringency of some rights does not match the
importance of the right holder’s interests. Raz (1994, 30ff.) writes that, more
often than not, we attach greater importance to a right than to its alleged un-
derlying interests. Because Raz conceives of rights as just morally protected
interests, he must look elsewhere for the explanation of the differential impor-
tance of some rights. So he appeals to the value of those rights for the common
good, particularly for the sustenance of a liberal culture. Similarly, the Will The-
ory lacks the ability to explain the relative importance of various rights. Like
the Interest Theory, it must avail itself of further claims to justify why the right
to life, for instance, is more important than the right to play dangerous games,
such as Russian roulette.
The fourth and most fundamental problem for both the Will Theory and the
Interest Theory lies elsewhere. Eric Mack identiﬁed this problem with respect
to the Interest Theory. This theory cannot account for the essential connec-
tion between moral rights and individuals’ inviolability.10 Contemporary non-
consequentialist moral philosophers emphasize this connection in discussing the
concept of moral rights.11 Thus, Robert Nozick (1974, 29) has famously argued
that rights are “side constraints”, i.e. deontic constraints. Deontic constraint
is a term of art in moral philosophy that denotes a moral duty or prohibition a
moral agent ought to respect regardless of the consequences. Not all deontic con-
straints are rights because some moral duties need not be correlated to rights.
On this view, rights are correlative to moral prohibitions in the form of: ‘Don’t
violate constraints C’. Thus, rights forbid treating people in certain ways, and
they must be respected no matter the overall beneﬁts that could be obtained by
alternative conduct. That is, in principle, rights may not be infringed even when
this can lead us to greater utility overall, and, more strikingly, even when by
infringing them we can minimize the overall violation of rights.12 Therefore, A’s
right is also independent from other people’s subjective interests, i.e., projects,
preferences, and decisions. This also includes cases in which ignoring or violat-
ing A’s right is needed to produce a greater non-moral or moral good. Banning
10 Eric Mack (2000, 95f.) has argued that the prohibition of trade-offs and the principled rejection of
paternalism are two essential features of rights.
11 Kamm 1996, 259–289; Spector 1992, 163–178; Thomson 1990, 123–148; Sen 1981; Gewirth 1981;
Dworkin 1978.
12 Nozick 1974, 29–33. See also Spector 1992, 163–178.362 Horacio Spector
such ‘maximizing’ violations reﬂects the Kantian ideal that autonomous individ-
uals are inviolable.13 However, non-consequentialists disagree about the degree
of inviolability persons are entitled to. Some consequentialists deny that rights
are absolute and say that it is permissible to infringe a right if infringing it is
sufﬁciently better for third parties than not infringing it is for the right holder
(Nozick 1975, 35).
The Interest Theory cannot explain why moral rights are side constraints,
because it regards the value of rights as based on the right holder’s subjective
interest. Because this interest can conﬂict with other people’s interests, the In-
terest Theory tends to accept the sacriﬁce of rights for the sake of overall interest
maximization. Mack’s argument is really more complex. He notes that interests
can have either agent-neutral or agent-relative value (Mack 2000, 78f.). A’s in-
terest has agent-neutral value when it is valuable to everyone, that is, when A’s
interest provides reasons to every agent (including A). By contrast, A’s interest
has agent-relative value when it provides reasons only to A (the bearer of the
interest). In the former case, rights fall prey to the utilitarian calculus. Because
the normative force of rights is grounded on the right holder’s interests, there is
always the possibility that those interests will be outweighed by other people’s
interests. Alternatively, if the right holder’s interests have only agent-relative
value, the theory fails to explain how those interests can justify holding someone
else under a duty (Mack 2000, 83f.).
The Will Theory is affected by another version of the same problem. This
theory focuses on the powers of right holders but ignores the underlying auto-
nomy-based justiﬁcation. Hart, for example, suggests that the justiﬁcation of
those powers associated with the Will Theory is an interest in autonomous choice
(Hart 1982, 188f.). Under the Kantian view, however, rights cannot be grounded
on interest—not even an interest in autonomous choice—because that would
disregard the value of autonomy. There is nothing morally special about pow-
ers that prevent us from ignoring them, i.e., breaching the controlled duties, if
that is needed to produce greater good or to minimize the violations of rights.
While the Interest Theory includes an inadequate form of justiﬁcation, the Will
Theory entirely lacks justiﬁcation. In either case, however, the result is much
the same: an inability to capture the anti-consequentialist features of rights in
today’s moral language.14
2. Value Incommensurability and Discourse
Incommensurability: The Case of Rights
Moral and legal rights were deep-seated in the value paradigm of individual
autonomy (V1) prevailing from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century. The
epitome of this paradigm value is Kant’s doctrine of rights. Under his doctrine,
13 Nozick, supra note at 35.
14 Gopal Sreenivasan (2007) has offered an ingenious ‘hybrid theory’ that tries to avoid the difﬁcul-
ties. I have criticized this theory in Spector 2007.Value Pluralism and the Two Concepts of Rights 363
legal rights are public and institutional ways of recognizing the status of per-
sons as autonomous beings (Ripstein 2009, 155–172). Since rights are based on
the status of individuals as autonomous agents, they are part and parcel of a
fundamentally deontological, non-consequentialist moral outlook. Legal rights
respect individual autonomy by vesting in individuals the powers that the Will
Theory picks out. It is no surprise that the Will Theory focuses on rights in
property and contract law, which are the cornerstone of Kant’s conception of law
(Habermas 1996b, 771f.). The Will Theory captures only a fragment of the mean-
ing of rights in the value paradigm of individual autonomy. Therefore, the Will
Theory is an incomplete account of a more substantial value paradigm, i.e., the
paradigm of individual autonomy, that once dominated the normative discourse.
Within this paradigm, rights are ‘trumps’ grounded in personal autonomy and
capable of overriding a good deal of consequentialist considerations. If the Will
Theory were restored in such a way so as to mention both powers and display
their autonomy-based justiﬁcation, it could easily explain why moral rights act
as deontic constraints. Moreover, it could explain why some rights are inalien-
able, i.e., because they are indispensable for preserving man’s autonomous ra-
tional nature, why paternalistic interferences with right holders are generally
unacceptable, i.e., because they disregard rational autonomous agency, and why
some rights are more important than others regardless of the strength of their
underlying subjective interests, i.e., because those more important rights are
prerequisites for the existence and action of rational human agency.
The exemplar I use for the value paradigm of individual autonomy is Kant’s
Doctrine of Right, the ﬁrst part of the Metaphysics of Morals, where he examines
at length the idea of moral rights as elements of a theory of justice. Kant (1996,
31f.) poses there a fascinating question: “But why is the doctrine of morals
usually called (especially by Cicero) a doctrine of duties and not also a doctrine
of rights, even though rights have reference to duties?” He goes on to answer:
“The reason is that we know our own freedom (from which all moral
laws, and so all rights as well as duties proceed) only through the
moral imperative, which is a proposition commanding duty, from
which the capacity for putting others under obligation, that is, the
concept of a right, can afterwards be explicated.”
Kant thinks that while duties have an epistemic priority over rights, rights are
fundamental in the justiﬁcation of law as a system of external sanctions. In
Kant’s words, “right is therefore the sum of the conditions under which the
choice of one can be united with the choice of another in accordance with a
universal law of freedom” (Kant 1996, 24). This principle seems an applica-
tion of Kant’s Categorical Imperative to the speciﬁc problem of distributing the
freedom of autonomous beings through a system of universal coercive norms.15
15 The Categorical Imperative is the fundamental unconditioned principle of Kant’s moral theory. In
its ﬁrst, best-known formula the Categorical Imperative says: “act only in accordance with that
maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.” (Kant 1998,
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In a sense, both duties and rights have a subordinate role in Kant. It is one
fundamental duty—enshrined by the Categorical Imperative—that grounds the
whole system of duties and rights. Practical reason, a necessary aspect of the
noumenal self, imposes this duty on the moral agent and, in so doing, secures his
freedom—both negative freedom from external causation and positive freedom
or self-determination. At that very abstract level, moral duty and metaphysi-
cal freedom come together and indeed constitute two inextricable sides to the
same thing. Hegel expresses this view in a forceful way: “In duty, the individual
liberates himself so as to attain substantial freedom.” (Hegel 1991, 192)
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the paradigm of individual au-
tonomy and its associated picture of rights protecting the liberty spheres of au-
tonomous and inviolable individuals started to give way to a different paradigm
centered on subjective interests, especially those appertaining to politically in-
ﬂuential groups.16 Rights ceased to be exclusively regarded as a way of recog-
nizing the status of autonomous agents and also became normative devices for
enhancing the interests of some groups, e.g., unionized workers, the worst off,
consumers, and so on, or for implementing social goals such as solidarity and
welfare. Yet, the old paradigm did not vanish. Rather, both paradigms started
to clash in legal and moral thought.
The value paradigm of subjective interests (V2) represented a fundamen-
tal change with respect to the value paradigm of individual autonomy. In-
stead of viewing law as an institution to demarcate and protect spheres of non-
intervention, the new paradigm regards law as an instrument for seeking col-
lective goals. We might speculate that the new paradigm was facilitated by the
emergence of an industrial economy and a concomitant urban society in which a
frictionless, physical demarcation of ownership rights was no longer a recipe
for coping with the violent and intractable conﬂicts that those new forms of
life aroused. Because the range of collective goals to be sought under the new
paradigm is vast and varies with the political equilibriums of the day, it is con-
genial with the working of democratic decision-making institutions envisaged
as ‘machines’ that produce collective interests worthy of support and, therefore,
various generations of rights that claim for political recognition and enforce-
ment.
The difference in value paradigms explains the radical semantic variation
of the term right as deployed in the paradigm of individual autonomy and the
paradigm of subjective interests. That is, because the values shaping each
paradigm are rival and incommensurable with each other, the meaning of rights
in V1 (rights1) and that of rights in V2 (rights2) are radically distinct. The point
is that rights1 and rights2 are radically different concepts, because they are
embedded in rival and incommensurable value paradigms. Today’s normative
language includes both terms but in ambiguous fashion.
Role/inferential semantics provides the most fruitful framework to discuss
the radical variation of rights in connection with diachronic value pluralism.17
16 Habermas 1996b; see also Duncan 1976, 1728ff..
17 The literature on role/inferential semantics of moral or legal terms includes: Ross 1975; PeczenikValue Pluralism and the Two Concepts of Rights 365
Under my favored interpretation of the semantics of moral terms, the meaning
of a term t is not given by a network of platitudinous propositions in which t is
a node. Rather, t’s meaning is given by a set of basic rules that govern deduc-
tive inferences from or to propositions that centrally contain t. Accordingly, the
meaning of rights in the paradigm of individual autonomy, i.e., rights1, might be
given, for instance, by the following basic inference rules:
(1) Acceptance of ‘B’s doing X with respect to A disrespects A’s autonomous
rational agency’ commits one to accepting ‘A has a right against B that B
does not do X’.
(2) Acceptance of ‘A has a right against B that B does not do X’ commits one
to accepting ‘B has a duty to A not to do X’.
(3) Acceptance of ‘right R is essential to maintain A’s autonomous rational
agency’ commits one to accepting ‘A cannot relinquish right R’, i.e., R is
inalienable.
By contrast, the meaning of rights in the paradigm of subjective interests, i.e.,
rights2, might be conveyed, for instance, through the following rules:
(1*) Acceptance of ‘B’s doing X with respect to A frustrates a relevant subjec-
tive interest of A’s’ commits one to accepting ‘A has a right against B that
B does not do X’.
(2) Acceptance of ‘A has a right against B that B does not do X’ commits one
to accepting ‘B has a duty to A not to do X’.
(3*) Acceptance of ‘the subjective interest grounding right R is more important
than the subjective interest grounding right R’ commits one to accepting
‘other things being equal, R is more important than R’.
This semantic approach makes it clear why the radical difference in the values
that infuse the paradigm of individual autonomy and the paradigm of subjective
interests change the semantic networks that provide the meaning of rights in
such a way that rights1 and rights2 are irreducibly distinct. In fact, the set of
rules (1), (2), and (3), which govern the meaning of rights1, and the set of rules
(1*), (2), and (3*), governing the meaning of rights2, cannot be coalesced into a
coherent set containing the ﬁve rules (rule (2) is one and the same in both sets).
In effect, rule (3) cannot be applied to rights2, because, under the paradigm of
subjective interests, it should be left to the right holder to establish whether
relinquishing a right of his furthers more effectively his subjective interests. In
turn, rule (3*) is inapplicable to rights1, because, under the paradigm of indi-
vidual autonomy, the importance of rights cannot be grounded on the strength
of the underlying subjective interests. Additionally, rules (1) and (1*) cannot
be blended in an overarching network of semantic rules because autonomous
rational agency and the satisfaction of subjective interests are different and in-
commensurable values.
Indeed, under the paradigm of individual autonomy, the value of autono-
mous rational agency is the only possible value, and, therefore, its commen-
and Spector 1987; Jackson and Pettit 1995; Wedgwood 2001; Sartor 2008.366 Horacio Spector
surability with any other value is logically ruled out. If the values of rational
autonomous agency and satisfaction of subjective interests were commensurable
with each other or with a higher-order value, a coalescing network encompass-
ing the networks corresponding to rights1 and rights2 might emerge. However,
given that the underlying values are rival and incommensurable, the two net-
works cannot be consistently reshufﬂed, except by the expedient of maintaining
common rule (2) and deleting all the others. This drastic method would ren-
der the concept of rights superﬂuous once we introduce the concept of duties.
Because no useful reshufﬂing of the semantic networks is possible, conceptual
fragmentation generates radical meaning variance under conditions of value in-
commensurability.
The thesis of the radical variation of the meaning of rights can be also ex-
pressed by appealing to the parallelism with theoretical terms. Just as theo-
retical terms deployed in theory T’ may be impossible to translate into the ter-
minology of a theory T, the term rights embodied in value paradigm V1 cannot
be translated into the normative vocabulary of value paradigm V2 because the
semantic networks deﬁning the meaning of each term cannot be coalesced back
into an overlapping network due to the rivalry and incommensurability of the
underlying values.
What is the relation between diachronic value pluralism and the semantic
fragmentation of normative terms? Let us say that a normative term t is em-
bedded in value paradigm (V) when some statements containing t are true in
all possible worlds in which the values embodied in V exist but false in some
possible worlds in which the values embodied in V do not exist. For instance,
the term right is embedded in the paradigm of individual autonomy, because
the statement that ‘people have a right to privacy’ is true in all possible worlds
in which individual autonomy is valuable but false in some possible worlds in
which individual autonomy is not a value, e.g., a world (W) in which privacy
does not contribute to any value existing in W. Now if values deployed in V1
and V2 are rival and incommensurable, the meaning of t in V2 may be radically
different from the meaning of T in V1. Both paradigms may have inconsistent
normative consequences because they embody conﬂicting values. This inconsis-
tency is likely to be reﬂected in the meaning of t. And given that those values
are incommensurable with each other, the normative inconsistency cannot be
reconciled by a procedure that ranks or weighs those values. Rivalry and incom-
mensurability of value paradigms generate the radical semantic fragmentation
of the normative terms embedded in those paradigms. The term radical means
here that a coalescing back of the fragmented meanings is not possible. To put
it brieﬂy, value-laden normative terms are radically different in meaning if the
values with which they are laden are both rival and incommensurable to one
another.
Since the thesis about the radical semantic variance of value-laden norma-
tive terms bears resemblance to the thesis of the radical meaning variation of
theory-laden scientiﬁc terms, it is useful to note that there are three main differ-Value Pluralism and the Two Concepts of Rights 367
ences between the semantic variation of scientiﬁc terms and that of normative
terms such as right.
First, while theoretical terms cannot be deﬁned in a theoretically neutral
language because they are theory-laden, some normative terms cannot be de-
ﬁned in a value neutral language because they are value-laden, and the values
with which they are laden are, in turn, incommensurable with each other. This
means that while meaning variance of theoretical terms explains the incommen-
surability of scientiﬁc theories, meaning variance of normative terms depends on
value incommensurability. The notion of dependence relevant here is a negative
one. If the value paradigms in which normative terms are embedded were com-
mensurable with one another, the fragmented semantic networks could coalesce
back into a consistent network, and radical meaning variance would not exist.
However, this process is not possible, because rival and incommensurable value
paradigms have irreconcilably inconsistent normative consequences.
Second, although there is widespread consensus that scientiﬁc terms have a
fundamental referential or extensional dimension, many meta-ethical positions
assign, if at all, only a limited importance to the referential function of norma-
tive terms.18 Empirical terms in scientiﬁc theories refer to the natural world,
and, therefore, co-reference of empirical terms used by older and newer theories
may allow theory comparability. Meaning invariance secured by co-reference
may be all we need to compare two theories and choose one as closer to the truth.
However, this does not apply to theoretical terms, such as mass, that lack direct
reference to empirical phenomena. In the absence of co-reference, the meaning
of theoretical terms is established by clusters of interrelated terms. Theoretical
terms can be likened to normative terms because none of them can be solely
deﬁned in an extensional way. Since no referential analysis can exhaust the
meaning of a normative term such as rights, the semantic variation of this term
implies that both ‘rights-discourses’ are untranslatable to each other. Therefore,
showing that meaning variance is compatible with invariance of reference is of
no consequence for the discussion of the semantic incommensurability of rights.
Finally, unlike successive scientiﬁc theories that entirely replace older ones,
value paradigms typically evolve by accretion, which means that at any given
time we do not encounter pure paradigms but rather mixed value paradigms
that maintain older ones—though often within more restricted scopes. Thus, in
contemporary legal cultures, the individual autonomy paradigm and the para-
digm of collective interests coexist in Berlinian fashion, giving rise to tensions
and conﬂicts that cannot be solved by reference to one neutral, all-encompassing
value. Older individualist values still are there because even if in modern indus-
trial democracies most of us are not farmers and ranchers, we stick to the view
18 Metaethics is the philosophical study of moral language and thinking; it is typically conducted
in a second-order langugage, or metalanguage. Non-cognitivist metaethical theories emphasize
the expressive function of moral utterances, instead of their denotation or reference (also called
extension). See Stevenson 1944; Hare 1952, 1963, 1981; Gibbard 1990; Blackburn 1993, 1998;
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of ourselves as autonomous beings, though perhaps uncomfortably so within
crowded cities and factories.
While the Will Theory fragmentarily captures the classical features of rights,
especially those associated with rights in deontological moral thinking, the In-
terest Theory seeks to accommodate the widely different kinds of rights that
modern legal systems recognize and their various justiﬁcations in subjective in-
terests. Given the rivalry and incommensurability of the values underlying both
theories and the semantic variation of rights embedded in each theory, it is im-
possible to provide a rational single uniﬁed analysis of rights that does justice
to the diverse and changing values that have shaped its various meanings.
3. The Minimal Meaning of Rights
The meaning of moral terms does not remain invariant across distinct value
paradigms, even if the same names are maintained. Now, because new value
paradigms often retain the old normative vocabulary, the problem of the se-
mantic variation of normative terms is seldom addressed, even by theorists who
endorse value incommensurability.19 Radicals who adopt a revisionist stance
and try to eliminate some old normative terms can always be encountered. For
example, Jeremy Bentham, a well-known defender of the paradigm of collective
interests, rejected natural rights with the famous dictum: “Natural rights are
nonsense upon stilts.” (Bentham 1987, 53) But the language of rights has sur-
vived this radical assault and has been transferred from the classical paradigm
to the new paradigm.
The paradigm of subjective interests did not replace the old term, but radical
conceptual change did occur, despite the fact that rights1 and rights2 share rule
(2), that is, that correlativity to duties is a common feature of both concepts
of rights. This fact alone could not explain why the term rights is maintained
as distinct from duties. Although rights1 and rights2 have radically different
meanings because they are embedded in conﬂicting and incommensurable value
paradigms, both terms share a minimal meaning. This semantic core can be
couched in the following inferential rule:
(4) Acceptance of ‘A has a right against B that B does not do X’ commits one
to accepting that ‘state coercion can permissibly be used, or must be used,
to secure fulﬁllment of B’s duty to A not to do X’.
Curiously, neither the Will Theory nor the Interest Theory emphasizes the min-
imal meaning conveyed by inferential rule (4). Yet Kant was mindful of this
feature of rights. In locating rights in the Doctrine of Right, he implicitly as-
sumed that the point of moral rights, as opposed to moral duties, is to establish
the conditions for the use of permissible coercion in society (Kant 1996, 31f.). In
19 For instance, Joseph Raz (1986, 165f.) offers a uniﬁed analysis of rights. The great exception is
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this respect, as in many others, Hart follows Kant. Hart (1955) also claims
that rights justify the use of public force.
The semantic variation of the term right must be accordingly qualiﬁed. Al-
though the term cannot be deﬁned across incommensurable value paradigms, it
has a common core that seems to be paradigm invariant. Right is conceptually
tied to state or public enforceability. This is a minimal content, though. A the-
orist of rights would probably not be content with just claiming that rights are
‘events of any kind that may or must be secured by state coercion’. But it was
perhaps this minimal content of rights that made the term’s maintenance use-
ful. The important point is that the thesis of semantic variation does not stand
in the way of the minimalist view, that is, the view that rights has an invariant
core meaning across various normative vocabularies associated with incommen-
surable value paradigms. This meaning is reﬂected in the basic fact that rights
discourse performs a political function, whatever values that discourse seeks to
respect or promote. Although this view falls short of revealing the value as-
sumptions that have shaped the semantics of rights, the paradox is that any
analysis of rights that goes beyond the minimalist view will ultimately ﬂounder
in the waters of diachronic value pluralism and its resultant fragmentation of
meaning.
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